Democratic Deficit
Democratic Deficit in Europe
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Description of Democratic deficit
The Concise Publication of the European Union describes democratic deficit in the following terms: [1] The 'democratic deficit' refers to the loss of legitimacy arising from the transfer of powers from sovereign nations to the supranational institutions of the Eu (see more in this European publication). In the early days of the Common Market such transfers were mainly to do with coal, steel and agriculture (see more in this European publication). But as their scale grew with the Single European Act and the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, the devaluation of the nation state began to impinge on the consciousness of ordinary people (see more in this European publication). Referendums in Norway and Switzerland rejected membership of the Community largely because those countries cherished an ideal of their own sovereign democracy: and the cliff-hanging referendums on the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and France showed that the erosion of national self-government was reaching the limits of public toleration in the existing member states. The hostile British reception to the encroachment of the Community in many areas touching everyday life suggested that centralisation could not proceed much further without the risk of the population becoming so alienated as even to contemplate withdrawal from the EU.
Several possible solutions for the democratic deficit have been proposed. An approach favoured by Germany and The Netherlands is to compensate for loss of democracy at the national level through increasing the powers of the European Parliament. This would greatly complicate the EU's already over-cumbersome decision-making processes, unless the Commission and the Council were prepared - or forced - to cede significant parts of their authority. A more conclusive objection, however, is that the Parliament suffers from a credibility gap. MEPs are elected on domestic, not European, issues. With one representative (chosen by the party list system) per 600,000 voters, the local MEP is a remote figure, let alone the foreign MEP. There are no Europe-wide parties or coherent political platforms. and the Parliament's unfortunate reputation as a travelling circus with inflated expense accounts (the product of its split location in Strasbourg, Brussels and Luxembourg) makes it an object as much of ridicule as of respect.
I have never understood why public opinion about European ideas should be taken into account. Raymond Barre, former French premier and European commissioner
A second approach, favoured from time to time in various forms by France and the UK, is to increase the influence of national parliaments over Community legislation, enabling them to subject it to greater scrutiny and more rigorous approval procedures (for example, a proposal rejected by a national parliament might have to be sent back to the Council and made subject to unanimity). This, however, would undermine the principle of qualified majority voting and if carried to any length would effectively restore the national veto. It would, therefore, go against the grain of 30 years of Community thinking.
The Commission's preferred solution is cosmetic - to promote the role of the regions, 'explain the benefits of the Community' and improve the transparencyof the EU's notoriously opaque institutions, in the name of 'bringing the EUcloser to the people'. To this end, the Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of 'subsidiarity', defined as the principle that European decisions should be taken at the lowest practicable level. In reality, however, subsidiarity is too vague to be enforceable at law. It is also, as presently construed, a sham. The integrationist Commission and Court of Justice are the arbiters of the level at which decisions are to be taken, and the doctrine of the acquis communautairerules out any repatriation of powers from the centre to the nation states. Indeed, if subsidiarity were given genuine significance it would mean a reversion towards the Gaullist and Thatcherite vision of a Europe of Nations - a vision which the EU has consistently rejected.
The democratic deficit therefore raises in acute form the problem of the EU's inability to win the affections of the people (see more in this European publication). Without a common culture, shared historical memories or a shared sense of destiny, a legitimate pan-European democracy appears impossible of fulfilment. By a supreme irony, if the EU itself were to apply for Community membership, it would be deemed too undemocratic to pass its own tests for admission. Perhaps the most promising approach is 'variable geometry', under which individual countries could freely choose whether to retain or to pool their control over key fields of policy. This concept, which has allowed the UK to retain the pound while the other member states have adopted the single currency, would address the need for democratic legitimacy - more strongly felt in some countries than in others - by allowing similar flexibility in such areas as defence, foreign policy, border control and criminal justice.
For the origins of the democratic deficit, the reader may wish to consult The 'European idea' and Founding Fathers.
Resources
Notas y References
Based on the book "A Concise Publication of the European Union from Aachen to Zollverein", by Rodney Leach (Profile Books; London)
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